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ABSTRACT
The Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 reduces the maximum statutory
personal tax rate on dividends from 38.1 percent to 15 percent.  This study analyzes dividend
declarations in the quarter following passage.  Aggregate dividends rose by 9 percent when boards
of directors first met following enactment.  Consistent with the dividend changes being tax-
motivated, they are increasing in the percentage of the firm held by individuals.  Dividend changes
also increased with insider ownership, consistent with managers acting in their own interests.
However, these results are limited primarily to firms that made large, special dividends.  We find
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On May 28, 2003, President George W. Bush signed the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (2003 Act).  Among other provisions, the legislation reduces the maximum 
statutory personal tax rate on dividends from 38.1 percent to 15 percent, the largest decrease in the 
dividend tax rate in U.S. history.  Proponents of the legislation asserted that dividend taxes were a binding 
constraint on dividend payments and that reducing the rate would boost dividends.  Dividends, however, 
have been in long decline, and the temporary nature of this legislation (it expires in 2009) raises doubts 
about its efficacy in reversing this trend.  The purpose of this paper is to determine the impact of the 
legislation on dividend payments. 
Understanding the extent to which dividend taxes impede corporate distributions is central to our 
understanding of the firm.
1  Scholars have long contended that the tax asymmetry accorded dividends 
(i.e., shareholders pay tax on non-deductible corporate distributions) affects capital structure, investments, 
and security valuations (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963; Miller, 1977; Miller and Modigliani 1961; 
Scholes et al. 2002; among many others).  Recently, this asymmetry has been linked to optimal debt 
levels (Graham 2000, 2003, Kemsley and Nissim, 2002), pension assets, (Frank 2002), trust-preferred 
stock (Engel, Erickson, and Maydew, 1999), the growth in employee stock option compensation 
(Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 1989), organizational structure (Guenther 1992, Gentry 1994) and corporate 
governance (La Porta et al. 2000). 
However, despite the importance of dividend taxation, little is known about the elasticity of 
dividends payments to shareholder taxes.  The reason is that at least three identification problems have 
thwarted empirical tests.  One, major changes in dividend tax rates are unusual.  Two, changes in 
                                                           
1 Some might consider a test of the impact of individual taxes on dividend policy premature, given the lack of 
consensus in the literature about the reasons why companies pay dividends (see discussions in Easterbrook 1984 and 
Bhattacharya 1979, among many others).  However, as we wait for a resolution of the dividend puzzle, it seems 
prudent to examine the 2003 Act for any possible insights into our understanding of firms and their investors.   2
dividend taxes usually have coincided with other major tax policy changes.  Three, dividend tax rates 
have always been identical to the rates on other sources of ordinary income, such as interest, rents, 
royalties and, since 1981, wages.
2  The last two problems have made it particularly difficult to isolate the 
effects of dividend tax rate changes on corporate distributions. 
The 2003 Act at least partially overcomes all three of these limitations.  First, the magnitude of 
the dividend tax rate change in the 2003 Act is unprecedented.  Second, the 2003 Act does not undertake 
fundamental reform that widely affects the tax code.  Its genesis was dividend tax reduction and remained 
so throughout legislative deliberations.  Third, dividends are no longer taxed at the same rate as other 
forms of ordinary income, facilitating isolation of the economic impact of a change in dividend tax rates.  
Consequently, the 2003 legislation provides an opportunity for scholars to test the impact of dividend 
taxes and thus address questions of capital structure, organizational structure (e.g., corporate versus flow-
through entity), corporate governance, and investor clienteles.   
This paper begins this investigation of the 2003 Act by asking whether boards of directors 
increased dividends when they had their first opportunities following enactment, specifically during the 
first six months following passage.  Although more quarters of data will be needed before we can fully 
understand the total impact of the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction on corporate distributions, our analysis 
of the first two quarters following enactment is not an unreasonably short period to anticipate a response.   
The reason is that we would anticipate a more rapid response to this legislation than normally 
observed with tax changes.
3  Unlike most legislative changes, which are permanent, the dividend tax 
reduction is temporary, reverting to 35 percent in 2009.  Moreover, the reversion could be as early as 
                                                           
2 None of the seven changes in dividend tax rates over the last quarter-century provides favorable conditions for 
isolating the responsiveness of dividends to dividend tax rates.  In 1982, as part of a broad tax reduction during the 
first Reagan Administration, the tax rate on dividends, as well as all other ordinary income, fell from 70 percent to 
50 percent.  During the sweeping 1986 tax reform, ordinary rates tumbled to 38.5 percent in 1987 and 28 percent in 
1988.  In 1991, the rate for dividends and all other ordinary income rose 3 percentage points to 31 percent.  Two 
years later the tax rate on all ordinary income increased to 39.6 percent.  Recently, all ordinary income tax rates have 
slipped slightly with a 0.5 percent decline to 39.1 percent in 2001 and another 0.5 percent reduction to 38.6 percent 
in 2002.   
3 Besides the urgency created by the temporary nature of the legislation, the purported purpose of the legislation 
(economic stimulus) depended critically on an immediate response to the rate reduction.  If dividend policy did not 
change during 2003 that does not rule out the possibility that dividend payments may increase eventually, but it does 
raise doubts about the efficacy of dividend tax relief as a means of immediate economic stimulus.     3
2005 for many shareholders.  Senator John Kerry has promised to restore the higher dividend tax rate for 
individuals in the two highest tax brackets if he is elected President in November 2004.  Consequently, 
procrastination may cost shareholders the opportunity to extract dividends from corporations at a 
historically low tax cost.    
The proposition that the largest decrease ever in dividend tax rates would substantially boost 
dividend payments is relatively straightforward.
4  It assumes that dividend taxes have been a binding 
constraint on shareholder distributions.  Freed of the constraint, dividends rise to a new equilibrium.  This 
“old view” logic underlies President Bush’s assertion at the signing that “The bill also allows for dividend 
income to be taxed at a lower rate. This will encourage more companies to pay dividends…”  The U.S. 
House of Representatives Ways and Means Committee’s Report on Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 adds that the dividend tax reduction will decrease the tax incentive to retain 
earnings, implying that the 2003 Act would boost dividend payments.   
Concurrent research by Chetty and Saez (2004) provides preliminary support for these claims.  
Examining longitudinal data from 1980 to the first quarter of 2004, Chetty and Saez (2004) report that the 
fraction of firms paying regular and special dividends rose after enactment.  They also claim that many 
firms that were already paying dividends substantially increased their payments.  Unfortunately, Chetty 
and Saez (2004) are unable to reject at conventional levels that the amount of the dividend increases 
occurred by chance, a failure they attribute to the volatility of the aggregate dividends series and outliers 
in their analysis.   
Moreover, as they acknowledge, their study cannot rule out a spurious relation between dividends 
and taxes.  This concern is heightened because they report that the increase in the percentage of firms 
paying and initiating regular dividends began as early as January 2003.  Although it is possible that 
changes in dividend policy were tax-motivated in early 2003, it seems unlikely.  President Bush first 
                                                           
4 An alternative scenario would predict that dividend payments would actually fall after a rate reduction.  This 
alternative assumes that shareholders demand the same after-tax dividends from their shareholdings, regardless of 
their dividend taxes.  Thus, a cut in dividend taxes reduces the amount of dividends needed to produce the required 
after-tax cash.    4
proposed exempting dividends from taxation (as opposed to a rate reduction) in January.  Controversial 
deliberations raged for five months, and several times it appeared likely that no bill would pass.  Finally, 
five months after the President’s original proposal, Congress chose to lower dividend taxes, not eliminate 
them.  Given the uncertainty about whether the bill would pass and, if so, the effective date of any 
changes, non-tax factors (e.g., an improving economy and corporate governance pressure to distribute 
excess cash) likely contributed more to early 2003 dividend increases than changes in expectations about 
future dividend tax rates.  If so, these same non-tax factors may have been the reason that dividends 
increased in the second half of 2003 following enactment. 
Employing an alternative approach, this paper collaborates many of the findings in Chetty and 
Saez (2004).  After examining the dividend declarations of 1,477 firms around enactment, we too 
conclude that more firms are issuing regular and special dividends after tax rates fell.  However, we can 
demonstrate a statistically significant increase in both regular and special dividend payments following 
enactment.  We also show that share repurchases declined after enactment, consistent with buybacks 
being a substitute for dividends, which became more attractive with a rate reduction.   
To rule out the possibility that nontax factors are driving the recent rise in dividends, we attempt 
to provide direct evidence linking the 2003 changes in tax rates and dividend increases.  The logic behind 
these tests is simple: If reductions in personal taxes caused dividends to surge, then we should expect to 
find a positive correlation between dividend increases and the extent to which the firms are owned by 
individuals, the only beneficiaries of the legislation. Unfortunately, we fail to find such a relation.   
However, we do find some evidence of a positive association between insider ownership and 
dividend increases.  This would suggest that the mere presence of large number of individual investors in 
the shareholder group was insufficient to alter dividend policy.  Rather having the firm owned heavily by 
managers and other key insiders, who benefited from the lower tax rates, was needed to boost dividends.  
Although we recognize that these tests suffer from the usual measurement problems facing 
empirical archival work, without this compelling link between dividend changes and shareholder tax 
benefits, we are hesitant to conclude that tax rates cut caused dividends to increase.  We are particularly   5
cautious because the economy improved during the same period that the legislation took effect and the 
business press was regularly reporting that the market was looking to dividends, rather than earnings, to 
assess firm quality.  In short, it appears possible that the increases in dividends that we observe reflect 
business fundamentals and changes in investor sentiment more than tax cuts for individual investors.  
Moreover, as detailed in the next section, there are a several reasons why dividends might not increase in 
response to the reduction in the dividend tax rate. 
The paper develops as follows:  The next section develops the study’s testable hypotheses.  
Sections 3 and 4 discuss tests of the impact of the legislation on regular, quarterly dividends.  Section 5 
investigates the impact on special, one-time dividends.  Section 6 reports results from tests of share 
repurchases.  Concluding remarks follow. 
 
2.  Hypothesis Development 
This section begins by detailing seven reasons why the 2003 Act might not have resulted in 
increased dividend payments.  Some of them lead directly to testable hypotheses.  Most do not, but are 
discussed here to provide a complete picture of the impediments faced by firms considering whether to 
increase their dividend payout following enactment of the 2003 Act.       
The first reason is that dividends have fallen into disfavor.  Fama and French (2001) document 
that the number of dividend payers has been halved over the last two decades.  In fact, only 70 percent of 
the Standard and Poor’s 500 were paying dividends at the end of 2002, down from 94 percent in 1980 
(Opdyke, J., Wall Street Journal, October 7, 2003).  DeAngelo, et al. (2003) add that dividends are 
largely concentrated among a few firms, with just 25 companies accounting for over half of the total 
dollar amount of dividends in the U.S. in 2000.  
Moreover, it is unclear the extent to which dividend taxes account for the declining popularity of 
dividends.  Both the dividend tax rate and the relative tax advantage of long-term capital gains (i.e., the 
spread between long-term capital gains tax rates and dividend tax rates) were less before the 2003 rate   6
reductions than they were 20-50 years ago when dividend yields were much greater.  Therefore, it is not 
obvious that reducing the dividend tax would suddenly result in a surge in dividend payments.   
Furthermore, even if firms were inclined to reconsider dividends in light of their individual 
shareholders’ enhanced demand for dividends, it is not clear that companies would initiate or increase 
their dividends.  Unprofitable, overleveraged, and cash-constrained firms are in no position to pay 
dividends, regardless of the dividend tax rate.  Likewise, growth firms, a large sector of the economy, 
have always been unlikely to pay dividends (Lintner, 1956).   
Moreover, nowadays, many stable, profitable firms with substantial cash balances pay no 
dividends (e.g., Intel, Dell, Cisco and, until January 2003, Microsoft).  Managers at these firms apparently 
have believed that shareholder value is maximized by retaining cash within the firm or using it to buy 
back stock, rather than distributing cash to shareholders in the form of dividends.  As a result, it is unclear 
that changing dividend tax policy is a lever that will affect corporate distributions to their shareholders.   
In fact, many corporations claim that dividend taxes are irrelevant in their dividend policy.  In a 
survey of corporate payout policy, Brav et al. (2003) report that 69 percent of CFOs state that the 
elimination of dividend taxation would definitely not or probably not affect their firms’ dividend 
decisions.  For example, in response to President Bush’s original dividend exclusion proposal in January 
2003 (which would have eliminated any dividend taxes for many companies’ shareholders), International 
Paper’s CEO, John Dillon, said that even if dividends were tax-exempt, it would “not change our 
behavior with respect to dividends.” (McKinnon, J., Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2003).   
The second reason that the 2003 Act might not materially increase dividends is that changes in 
dividends alter employee stock option compensation.  Dividends reduce the value of stock options 
because the distribution of cash reduces the net assets, and thus share price, of the firm; however, those 
dividends are not distributed to option holders.  Thus, increasing dividends may require granting 
additional stock options to employees and/or shifting to other forms of compensation.  The costs of 
restructuring existing compensation arrangements and increasing potential principal-agent problems by   7
undermining the incentives provided by stock options may exceed the benefits of lower dividend taxes on 
individuals.  If so, some firms may opt to leave their dividend policy unaltered.   
The third reason we might not observe a large response to the 2003 Act relates to the alternative 
minimum tax (AMT), which taxpayers pay if it exceeds their regular tax.  Because the AMT applies to 
individuals with reasonably high levels of income (typically taxable income between $100,000 and 
$500,000), the AMT is most likely the relevant tax for many individual shareholders.  The legislation 
reduced the maximum statutory tax rate on dividends to 15 percent for both regular and alternative 
minimum tax purposes.  However, since the maximum statutory tax rate on dividends was already capped 
at 28 percent for the AMT, shareholders facing the AMT enjoy less benefit from the 2003 Act than 
individuals facing the regular tax, who may have been taxed at Federal rates as high as 38.1 percent on 
their dividends. 
Furthermore, since the regular tax reduction for dividends exceeds the AMT tax reduction for 
dividends (because of the differences in statutory rates), the 2003 Act will cause some individuals, who 
have avoided the AMT in the past, to face the AMT in the future (because it exceeds their now-reduced 
regular tax).  As a result of facing the AMT (the calculation of which is beyond the scope of this paper), 
these individuals will now lose some non-dividend tax preferences.  Consequently, their marginal tax 
rates on dividends can exceed 15 percent.  In other words, because the AMT disallows the exclusion or 
deductibility of various tax preferences permitted under the regular tax, the net effect of a shift from 
regular tax to AMT can be marginal tax rates on dividends that exceed 15 percent.  Thus, the benefits of 
the 2003 Act are further mitigated, lessening any demand for increased dividends.    
The fourth reason that the dividend tax cut may not affect corporate payouts is that the dividend 
tax rate reduction only benefits shares held by individuals or flow-through entities, e.g., mutual funds, 
partnerships, trusts, S corporations, or limited liability corporations that pass dividend income through to 
investors’ personal tax returns.  Moreover, these shareholders must hold shares for at least 60 days in the 
120-day period beginning 60 days before the ex-dividend date for the reduced rates to apply.  
Shareholders with shorter trading horizons, tax-exempt organizations, tax-deferred accounts (e.g.,   8
qualified retirement plans, including IRAs and 401(k)), corporations and foreigners are unaffected by the 
legislation.  Thus, companies held by unaffected shareholders have no incentive to alter their dividend 
policy.   
Stated in alternative form, the first hypothesis predicts that: 
H1:  Increases in dividend payments following the 2003 Act were increasing in the percentage 
of the payer’s stock held by individual investors. 
 
 
Rejecting the null hypothesis that changes in dividend payments are unrelated to individual ownership 
would provide strong evidence that corporations took shareholder tax preferences into account when they 
set their dividend policy following the 2003 Act.  This evidence would be particularly compelling because 
it is difficult to construct an alternative non-tax explanation of why firms with heavy individual stock 
ownership increased their dividend declarations following the dividend tax rate reduction more than 
companies with large institutional ownership.  
On the other hand, we will fail to reject the null if firms ignore their shareholders’ tax preferences 
in setting dividend policy.  Prior literature is mixed on this question.  Barclay, Holderness and Sheehan 
(2003) report that dividends seldom change following the substitution of a new large blockholder with 
different tax status.  Conversely, Perez-Gonzalez’ (2003) reports that dividend policy is heavily 
influenced by the tax status of the largest shareholder.  Lie and Lie’s (1999) add that managers consider 
shareholders’ tax considerations when deciding between dividends and share repurchases.  Furthermore, 
concurrent work by Hsich and Wang (2004) show that tax incentives of insiders affect corporate payout 
choices, corroborating the findings in this study.  
The next two reasons motivate the second hypothesis, which concerns the type of dividend 
paid—regular, quarterly dividends versus special dividends.   One, firms are reluctant to increase their 
regular, quarterly dividends since the increase likely will have to be rescinded (Healy and Palepu, 1988).  
By increasing their quarterly dividends in response to the 2003 tax change, firms greatly increase the 
probability that they will have to cut their quarterly dividends in the future (or accept a suboptimal 
distribution policy) because the rate reduction is temporary.     9
The dividend tax rate will revert to 35 percent on January 1, 2009.
5  Furthermore, John Kerry has 
promised to rescind the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction for individuals in the highest two tax brackets, if 
he is elected President in November, 2004.
 6  Since many individual shareholders fall in these upper 
brackets, restoration of the higher tax rates for them likely would substantially undermine the support for 
corporate distributions in the form of dividends.  Given this uncertainty about future dividend tax rates 
and because the market is known to respond negatively to reductions and omissions of dividend payments 
(Brav et al. 2003), it seems reasonable that many companies would forgo the opportunity provided by the 
2003 Act to increase their regular, quarterly dividends to avoid the probable rescission. 
Two, regular, quarterly dividends may alleviate asymmetric information costs by conveying 
information about future earnings to the market.  If so, tax-motivated adjustments in the quarterly 
dividends could distort the intended signal.  The information costs associated with investors’ inability to 
distinguish between increases that are tax-induced and increases that are profitability-induced may exceed 
the benefits of reduced shareholder taxes under the new law.  Thus, it is possible that managers would 
intentionally not alter their regular, quarterly dividend policy to maintain credibility with the market. 
These two reasons—costs associated with rescission and asymmetric information—can be 
avoided by declaring a special dividend rather than altering the firm’s regular quarterly distribution.  This 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2:  Firms increased their special dividends following the 2003 Act. 
 
 
The final reason that firms may not increase dividends is that among the profitable companies 
who could distribute profits to shareholders and would consider their shareholders’ tax preferences in 
those distributions, the tax-efficient distribution continues to be share repurchases.  Although the 
                                                           
5 Some may assume that sunset provisions, such as the reversion of the dividend tax rate to 35 percent, will be 
automatically extended before they take effect.  Gale (2003), however, makes a compelling case that the costs of 
extending all the various sunset provisions currently in the law is probably fiscally impracticable.  He estimates that 
removing all the sunsets in the tax code would reduce government revenue by almost $2 trillion over the next 
decade. 
6 Individuals in the highest two brackets (maximum statutory rates of 33 percent and 35 percent) receive 38 percent 
of all the dividend income reported in the United States.   10
maximum statutory tax rate on dividends now equals the top rate on long-term capital gains (which was 
reduced from 20 percent to 15 percent in the 2003 Act), dividends continue to be taxed disadvantageously 
compared with capital gains for at least four reasons.  One, dividends accelerate the tax payment that 
could be deferred until the stock is sold (or fully avoided if held until the shareholder dies).  Two, unlike 
dividends, shareholders can time the sale of an investment and thus pay the resulting capital gain tax 
when the shareholder’s marginal tax rate is lowest.  Three, with capital gains a portion of the proceeds is 
treated as a return of basis and thus goes untaxed.  Conversely, basis cannot be used to avoid dividend 
income.
7  Four, since only $3,000 of capital losses (net of capital gains) can be deducted each year, capital 
gains, unlike dividends, enable individuals to accelerate utilization of their pool of capital losses, an 
important consideration for many individuals following the downturn in the equity markets from 2000 to 
2002. 
However, it is possible that the rate changes in the 2003 Act shifted the balance toward dividends, 
i.e., share repurchases continue to dominate dividends, but not by as much as they did before the 
legislation.  If so, because dividends have been found to be substitutes for share repurchases (see Miller 
and Modigliani, 1961; Grullon and Michaely, 2002; among others), we predict a decline in share 
repurchases following enactment.  This leads to the third hypothesis: 
H3:  Firms decreased their share repurchases following the 2003 Act. 
 
 
3.  Empirical Approach 
This section of the paper describes the selection of our sample of 1,463 regular dividend-paying 
companies.  It then details the tests conducted on these companies to determine whether corporate 
distributions increased following enactment of the 2003 Act.  Further tests are conducted to determine 
whether the changes are correlated with the mix of individual and institutional shareholders. 
                                                           
7 As an example, suppose a shareholder faces a choice between receiving $100 in dividends and selling an 
investment, which he purchased for $25, for $100.  In both cases, the shareholder has $100 before taxes.  With 
dividends, however, he pays $15 in taxes (100*15 percent), leaving $85 after-tax.  With the sale, he pays $11.25 
[(100-25)*15 percent) in taxes, leaving 88.75 after-tax.  The $3.75 ($88.75-85) difference is one of timing.  When 
the  stock is finally sold, the basis will be recovered.   11
A.  Sample 
The sample selection is designed to identify corporations that declared regular dividends during 
the first six months following the Congressional passage of the bill on May 23, 2003 or (for purposes of 
constructing a control sample) during the same period in 2002.  We draw the initial sample from the 
14,258 dividend declarations representing 3,101 firms from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) between May 23, 2003 and November 22, 2003 and/or the same period in 2002.  To exclude non-
corporate distributions on common stock, we require firms to have CRSP share code 11 (eliminates 1,151 
firms).
 8   Since we are examining changes in firm payout policy over time, we require our firms to be in 
existence from October 1, 2001 through December 31, 2003 (eliminates 195 firms). We limit our sample 
to regular quarterly cash dividends (CRSP distribution code 1232) for firms that did not change fiscal 
year-ends during the period (eliminates 226 firms).  Firms also must have Compustat earnings 
information available for the quarter immediately preceding the dividend declaration date as well as our 
proxies for individual holdings (eliminates 66 firms).  This leaves a final sample of 1,463 companies.   
Table 1 provides descriptive information for the 1,463 sample firms. The mean (median) 
company has a market capitalization of $4.8 ($0.6) billion with total assets of $12.5 ($1.3) billion.  Its 
mean (median) sales are $1.0 ($0.1) billion, on which it earns $73 ($7) million. 
The 1,463 sample firms are concentrated in financial services and manufacturing.  615 firms (42 
percent of the sample) are in SIC 6 (finance, insurance and real estate); 459 companies (31 percent) are 
manufacturers (SIC 2 and 3).  The remaining companies are mostly in SIC 4 (transportation and utilities) 
with 137 firms (9 percent) and SIC 5 (trade) with 115 corporations (8 percent). 
  
B.  Comparing Regular, Quarterly Dividend Payments Before and After the 2003 Act 
To determine the initial impact of the 2003 Act on regular, quarterly dividend payments, we 
compare dividends declarations during the first two quarters following passage of the bill with previous 
                                                           
8 Share code 11 indicates that dividends are declared on ordinary common shares.  This restriction results in the 
exclusion of ADRs, REITS, closed-end funds and partnership units that face dividend taxation unaffected by the 
2003 Act.    12
quarters.  (Assuming boards of directors meet at least once every three months to declare dividends, this 
investigation period ensures that we captured the boards’ first two opportunities to alter dividends 
following the rate reduction.)  Specifically, we compare the dividends declared from May 23, 2003 (the 
first working day following Congressional approval of the 2003 Act) to November 22, 2003 with the 
dividend payments declared during the five quarters ending May 22, 2003.  Since Congressional passage 
occurred late at night on May 22, 2003, corporate boards meeting on the 23rd would have known that 
their shareholders would face a maximum statutory rate of only 15 percent and presumably could have 
confidently adjusted dividends upward beginning on that date.  Thus, although the bill did not become 
law until the President signed it on May 28, 2003, it should have been clear to corporate officials, 
beginning on May 23, 2003, that the bill would become law because the President had strongly supported 
dividend tax relief throughout the legislative process.   
Table 2, Panel A provides summary statistics for the regular, quarterly dividend declarations of 
the 1,463 sample firms.  We find that 1,402 firms declared dividends during the quarter immediately 
following passage of the bill (May 23-August 22, 2003).  In the subsequent quarter (August 23, 2003-
November 22, 2003) 18 more firms declared dividends for an average of 1,411 firms during the two 
quarters following enactment.  This compares with an average of 1,310 firms in the same two quarters a 
year earlier.  We can reject at the 0.01 level that this 8 percent increase in frequency is by chance.   
Over the seven-quarter period, total dividends rose from $36.0 billion to $41.6 billion, a 16 
percent increase.  Total dividend declarations rose every quarter with the largest jump around enactment, 
swelling $2.9 billion increase (8 percent) from the quarter ended May 22, 2003 to the quarter ended 
August 22, 2003.  This compares with a $1.8 billion cumulative increase (5 percent) over the five quarters 
before enactment and a $0.9 billion rise (2 percent) in the second quarter following enactment. 
The mean (median) dividend declaration rose from 14.5 (11.0) cents per share in the quarter 
ended May 22, 2002 to 15.3 (12.0) cents per share in the quarter ended November 22, 2003.  The mean 
(median) dividend payment across the two quarters comprising the post-enactment period is 15.2 (0.120) 
cents per share, compared with 14.6 (11.4) cents per share in the five quarters comprising the pre-  13
enactment period.  This aggregate pre/post mean (median) difference is significant at the 0.05 (0.01) 
level.   
We further test whether dividend declarations increased over the investigation period by 
comparing within-firm dividend changes.  For example, when we subtract each firm’s dividend 
declaration in the quarter ended May 22, 2003 (the quarter before enactment) from its dividend 
announcement in the quarter ended August 22, 2003 (the first quarter after enactment), we find that the 
mean increase is 0.7 cents per share, which is significant at the 0.001 level.  As seen in the last column of 
Panel A, this mean difference exceeds the mean difference for all other adjacent quarters.  Two other 
increases are highly significant: 0.4 cents per share (between the two quarters immediately after 
enactment) and 0.3 cents per share (between the two quarters immediately before enactment).   
Table 2, Panel B repeats this analysis for the 1,280 firms that paid regular dividends in each of the 
seven quarters.  These 1,280 firms paid almost all of the dividends in the U.S.  For example, in the quarter 
ended November 22, 2003, these 1,280 firms paid all, but $1 billion, (98 percent) of the dividends in the 
full sample of 1,463 firms.  Not surprisingly, we find that the inferences drawn from Panel A above hold 
with this sample of continual dividend payers.  Briefly, declarations rose every quarter with the largest 
increase ($2.5 billion or 7 percent) around enactment.  The mean (median) dividend payment across the 
two quarters comprising the post-enactment period is 15.7 (13.0) cents per share, compared with 14.8 
(12.0) cents per share in the five quarters comprising the pre-enactment period.  We can reject that this 
mean (median) difference is random at the 0.01 (0.01) level.  The last column of Panel B confirms that 
mean of the within-firm differences in dividend declarations is greatest around enactment (0.5 cents per 
share) although significantly positive as early as the quarter ending February 22, 2003. 
We conclude from Table 2 that the largest dividend increases were immediately following 
enactment.  However, dividends were rising before enactment and continued rising in the second quarter 
after enactment.  This leaves us to conclude that non-tax factors (such as an improving economy) likely 
played a role in boosting dividends.  The unresolved question is the extent to which taxes assisted in the 
dividend increases.     14
These initial findings are consistent with more firms paying dividends as well as more dividends 
being paid after the passage of the 2003 Act.  Although this implies that the tax rate reduction boosted 
dividend payments, we cannot rule out the possibility that dividends have been on an upward trend or that 
dividends increased in this period for reasons unrelated to taxes, such as improved earnings, stronger cash 
flow, or reduced growth opportunities.   
Table 3 reports summary statistics from a regression intended to control for these possible non-
tax effects.  The analysis is conducted on the full sample of 1,463 firms at the firm-quarter level.  Not all 
firms declared dividends every quarter.  Thus, we are left with 9,448 regular dividend declarations across 
the seven quarters.  We have missing data for 277 declarations, leaving us with 9,171 firm-quarters to 
examine.   
The dependent variable is the dividends per share declared in the quarter (DPS).  The explanatory 
variables are earnings per share (EPS), intended to capture the firm’s profitability; free cash flow (FCF), a 
measure of the firm’s payout capacity; and the market-to-book ratio (MTB), designed to control for 
growth opportunities for which firms might employ excess cash.  Both EPS and FCF are lagged one 
quarter.  We add a categorical variable (POST), which equals one for declarations after enactment.  We 
will interpret a positive coefficient on POST as consistent with dividends increasing following enactment. 
Panel A provides descriptive statistics.  The mean (median) dividend per share is 15 (12) cents.  
Mean (median) EPS is 39 (35) cents per share.   Mean and median FCF are negative.  Mean (median) 
MTB is 2.23 (1.82). 
Panel B presents the regression results.
9  The first column shows the results from an ordinary 
least squares approach.  The coefficient on EPS is positive, as expected, consistent with dividends rising 
with firms’ profits.  No other control variables are significantly different from zero.  The coefficient on 
POST is positive and significant at conventional levels.  This finding is consistent with regular, quarterly 
                                                           
9 Conclusions are unaltered when the equations are estimated using firm fixed effects.  The POST coefficient is 
always positive and significant at the 0.001 level.    15
dividends being greater after enactment than they were before, conditional on several possible non-tax 
effects.   
The second column repeats the process using rank regressions.  Results hold.  The POST 
coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.01 level. The next two columns report the results from 
repeating the first two estimations using the reduced sample of 1,280 firms that paid dividends in every 
quarter.  Inferences are qualitatively unchanged.  The POST coefficient remains positive and highly 
significant. 
The final column uses a logistic estimation process.  It expands the sample to include quarters in 
which no dividends were declared and redefines the dependent variable as a categorical variable which 
equals one if a dividend is paid in the period.  The POST coefficient is positive and highly significant, 
consistent with an increased frequency in dividend payments after enactment.   
We infer from these results that regular, quarterly dividends increased in both amounts and 
frequency following enactment of the 2003 dividend tax rate reduction.  This conclusion holds even after 
taking into account the apparent boost to dividends arising from increased profitability. 
 
C.  Linking Dividends to Shareholders 
We continue our regression analysis to test the hypothesis that dividend increases are greatest in 
those companies whose shareholders benefit most from the rate reduction.  That is, companies held 
predominantly by individuals directly through their own taxable accounts or through conduits where the 
taxation of the dividends lands ultimately on an individual tax return.  These conduits include 
partnerships, S corporations, limited liability corporations, and some trusts.   
Documenting a link between dividend increases and the individual ownership (as broadly defined 
above) would provide particularly compelling evidence that the dividend increases are attributable to tax 
changes because it is difficult to construct a non-tax reason why dividends surged in the second half of   16
2003 for companies held disproportionately by individuals.
10  Conversely, if we fail to find a link between 
declarations and individual ownership, it remains feasible that the increase in dividend declarations is 
caused by omitted correlated variables (such as changes in expectations about future profitability). 
The dependent variable is the dividends declared in period t (DIV t), where period t includes dates 
before and after enactment.  The first control variable, which is designed to capture any stickiness in 
dividends, is the dividends declared in the prior period (DIVt-1 or LAGDIVt).  To capture variability in the 
source of dividends, we include earnings from the prior period t-1 (EPS t-1).
11  All three variables are 
expressed in per share amounts.
12   
Ideally, the key explanatory variable of interest would measure the change in dividend taxes 
experienced by the marginal investor as a result of the 2003 Act.  If the marginal investor is an individual 
whose tax rate fell from 38.1 percent to 15 percent, then the measure would capture this 23.1 percentage 
point decline in dividend tax rates.  If the marginal investor is a tax-deferred entity or a tax-exempt entity, 
then the 2003 rate reduction would have no effect on its dividend taxes.   
Unfortunately, the marginal investor and his tax return are unobservable.  Thus, the literature has 
turned to less precise measures to estimate the extent to which a firm’s marginal investor is affected by 
personal tax changes.  No one method has emerged as the standard.  Perez-Gonzalez’ (2003) uses the 
largest single shareholder to proxy for the dividend tax treatment of the marginal investor.  Jin (2004) 
measures the extent to which the institutional investors are conduits that pass the taxation of the dividends 
to individuals.  Ayers, et al. (2002, 2003), Blouin, et al. (2003), and Dhaliwal, et al. (2003) use 13-F 
filings to develop measures of the percentage of the firm held by individual shareholders.   
                                                           
10 As an illustration of the difficulty of constructing an alternative hypothesis, imagine one based on stories in the 
business press that investors have become more focused on cash dividends than accounting earnings after Enron, 
WorldCom and similar debacles.  If this is true, the shift to cash from profits should be greatest in companies with 
the most asymmetric information between managers and investors.  One possible set of such companies are those 
with many, small individual shareholders.  If so, it is feasible that a positive correlation could be detected between 
individual ownership and dividend increases, as predicted in this paper.  However, since Enron, WorldCom and 
most of the financial collapses occurred in 2001 and early 2002, it is unclear why this shift in preferences to 
dividends did not occur until the summer of 2003.  Also, we find some evidence that dividend hikes are increasing 
in insider ownership, which is contrary to the asymmetric information story.  Also, it is unclear how paying a one-
time, special dividend allays long-term concerns about information asymmetries.    
11 Conclusions are qualitatively unaltered if we use earnings from the current period, i.e., (EPS t). 
12 Inferences are robust to scaling by total assets or share price.   17
We follow this last group in developing two measures of individual ownership.  IND is one less 
the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F filings and collected by 
CDA/Spectrum, as of June 30, 2002.
13  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured 
by holdings of officers and directors as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.   Obviously, 
this study’s ability to link dividend changes to shareholder tax preferences rests critically on the 
usefulness of these measures to discriminate across firms. 
The explanatory variables include the firm’s dividend for the six months immediately preceding 
enactment divided by its stock price (DYIELD).  This measure is designed to capture the capacity for 
dividend increases.  Firms with high dividend yields presumably had less capacity to increase their 
dividends after enactment than firms paying little or no dividends.   
We interact IND, INSIDE and DYIELD with a categorical variable (POST), which is one if the 
dividend was declared after enactment and zero otherwise.  This recognizes the possibility that IND, 
INSIDE and DYIELD may have had different impacts on dividend declarations after enactment.  A 
positive estimated regression coefficient on POST*IND will be interpreted as evidence that dividend 
declarations after enactment of the 2003 Act were increasing in the level of individual ownership in the 
company.  Since we are unaware of any non-tax reason that dividends should have risen with the 
percentage of stock held by individual investors during the summer of 2003, we will interpret a positive 
coefficient on POST*IND as strong evidence that the 2003 rate reductions increased dividends.  Likewise, 
a positive estimated regression on POST*INSIDE will be interpreted as evidence that dividends increases 
were rising in the percentage of the firm owned by insiders. 
DIVi,t  =  β0 + β1 LAGDIVi,t + β2 EPS i,t-1 + β3n (1+ POST ) * [α0 + α1 INDi + α2 INSIDEi + α3 
DYIELDi] + CONTROLS  + εi,t    (1) 
                                                           
13 We intentionally chose individual ownership data from a date before Bush’s original dividend exclusion proposal 
in January 2003 to avoid the possibility that clienteles began to shift in anticipation of a reduction in dividend tax 
burden.  If we use post tax relief measures of individual ownership, we could erroneously infer that high individual 
ownership firms responded to the legislation by increasing dividends, when in actuality individuals simply bought 
disproportionately large numbers of shares in companies that were increasing their dividends.    18
CONTROLS are intended in the model to capture other possible determinants of the level of dividends, 
such as industry, growth, risk, and size, which are presumed not to vary systematically with the change in 
dividend tax rates (and thus are not interacted with POST).  
Rather than tabulate the results from estimating equation (1), we convert the levels expression in 
equation (1) to a changes model.  Equation (1) produces two observations for every firm in the sample, 
one observation from before enactment and another from after enactment.  Below in equation (2), we 
employ a changes model that yields one observation per firm.  In short, we regress the change in a firm’s 
dividends around enactment, while controlling for its changes in dividends around a similar period when 
tax rates did not change. 
∆DIVi = β0 + β1 LAG∆DIVi + β2 ∆EPSi + β3 INDi + β4 INSIDE i + β5 DYIELDi + εi,t  (2) 
∆DIVi is the difference between the dependent variables in firm i’s post-enactment equation and firm i’s 
pre-enactment equation.  Similarly, LAG∆DIVi is the difference between firm i’s post and pre-enactment 
measures of LAGDIV, and ∆EPSi is the difference between earnings per share after and before the rate 
reduction.  The other possible control variables (CONTROLS), which are constant before and after the 
legislative change (e.g., industry), drop from the regression model when the differences are taken.  So 
does POST, since all observations now include data from both before and after enactment.  This leaves 
the coefficient on IND (INSIDE) to capture the impact of individual (insider) ownership on changes in 
dividend payments and the coefficient on DYIELD to capture differential effects of capacity on dividend 
payments.  A positive estimated regression coefficient on IND (INSIDE) will be interpreted as evidence 
that the increase in dividends following passage of the 2003 Act was increasing in the percentage of a 
firm owned by individuals (insiders). 
   
D.  Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Results 
To estimate equation (2), we must define the pre and post enactment periods.  We begin by 
defining the post-enactment period as the six months following enactment (May 23-November 22, 2003)   19
and the pre-enactment period as the six months preceding enactment.  (Below we repeat the analysis with 
a variety of pre and post periods.)  Consequently, ∆DIV is dividends per share as declared from 5/23/03 to 
11/22/03 less dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 5/22/03.  LAG∆DIV is dividends per share 
as declared from 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 less dividends per share as declared from 5/23/02 to 11/22/02.  
∆EPS  is earnings per share as reported over the two quarters, 11/23/03 to 5/22/03, less earnings per share 
as reported over the two quarters, 5/23/02 to 11/22/02.   
Table 4, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the regression variables.  The dependent 
variable (∆DIV) ranges from a 85-cent decline in dividends per share to a 73-cent increase in dividends 
per share with a mean increase of 2.2 cents per share.  LAG∆DIV has a mean value of 0.8 cents per share.  
Mean (median) lagged earnings (∆EPS) are 9.2 (3.0) cents per share.  The mean and median quarterly 
dividend yields (DYIELD) are 1.2 (1.1) percent.    
IND and INSIDE are the two key explanatory variables for testing the hypothesis that shareholder 
mix affects dividends.  Our estimate of individual ownership varies widely with the intraquartile ranging 
from 28.5 percent to 82.5 percent.  Mean (median) IND is 52.4 (52.5) percent.  Mean (median) INSIDE is 
7.1 (2.6) percent.   
Table 4, Panel B provides Pearson’s and Spearman’s rank correlation matrices for the regression 
variables.  As expected, both correlations indicate that ∆DIV moves directly with lagged changes in 
dividends (LAG∆DIV) and inversely with the correlated dividend yield (DYIELD).  However, only one 
correlation involving the dependent variable and the two measures of individual ownership is 
significantly greater than zero.  The Pearson correlation between ∆DIV and INSIDE is 0.07.   
 
4.  Regression Results 
A.  Primary Tests 
  Table 5 reports the summary statistics from ordinary least squares estimation using the 1,463 
sample firms.  The first column reports the estimation results with IND in the regression; the second   20
column with INSIDE in the regression; and the third with both measures of individual ownership.  In all 
three columns, the coefficient on LAG∆DIV is positive, as expected, consistent with dividends being 
sticky.  The coefficient on ∆EPS is not significantly different from zero.  Consistent with the univariate 
analysis, the coefficient on DYIELD is negative and highly significant, implying that firms with a high 
dividend yield before enactment responded with smaller increase in dividends. 
  The estimated regression coefficient on IND in the first column enables us to test whether 
dividends increased during the quarter following enactment of the 2003 Act (compared with the same 
period in 2002) in proportion to the percentage of the company held by individuals.  Contrary to 
expectations, we find a negative estimated regression coefficient on IND, though not significantly 
different from zero.   
  The second column tests whether dividend increases are linked to insider ownership.  Here we 
find a positive and significant coefficient on INSIDE.  The coefficient yields an economic interpretation.  
For example, the product of the INSIDE coefficient of 0.031 and the mean INSIDE of 0.071 is 0.2 cents of 
increased dividends per share or 10 percent of the mean value of ∆DIV.  Similarly, a firm moving within 
the intraquartile range (from 0.6 percent insider ownership to 8.1 percent insider ownership) would 
experience an increase in dividends of 0.2 cents per share or 10 percent of the mean value of ∆DIV. 
  The third column includes both measures of individual ownership.  Inferences are unchanged.  
The IND coefficient remains insignificant.  The INSIDE coefficient increases to 0.036 with a t-statistic of 
2.3. 
 
B.  Alternative Periods 
The inferences drawn above concerning the lack of relation between IND and changes in 
dividends is robust to alternative specifications of the pre and post-enactment periods.  However, results 
are not robust for our finding of a positive relation between INSIDE and dividend increases.    21
Table 6 reports the coefficients and t-statistics for IND and INSIDE under five different period 
specifications.  Although not tabulated, the model contains the same control variables as above.  IND and 
INSIDE are evaluated separately, i.e., the same estimates as the first two columns in Table 5.  Contrary to 
expectations, the IND coefficient is always negative, though never significant.   
The INSIDE coefficient is always positive.  However, it is highly significant in only one 
specification (column 6), when the post-enactment period is the second quarter following enactment and 
the pre-enactment period is the last quarter before enactment.  It is marginally significant (column 4), 
when the post-enactment period is the second quarter following enactment and the pre-enactment period 
is the first quarter after enactment.  It is not significant in the other three specifications.  We infer from 
these findings that including the second quarter after enactment is critical to finding a significant 
coefficient on INSIDE.  This implies that it may have taken firms until the second quarter following 
enactment to begin adjusting their dividend policy to reflect the interest of insiders with large holdings. 
  We conclude that the evidence is mixed concerning whether dividend increases were greatest in 
those companies whose shareholders most benefited from the dividend tax rate reduction.  We find no 
evidence that disproportionately large ownership by individual shareholders contributed to an increase in 
regular, quarterly dividends.  We find conflicting evidence about the influence of insiders on changes to 
the firm’s dividend policy.  If we had detected a strong relation between changes in dividend payouts and 
individual and insider ownership, we would have interpreted such a result as providing strong evidence 
that the dividend increases were related to the tax rate reductions.  Since we do not detect a strong 
relation, these results give us some pause.   
 
5.  Special Dividends 
Regular, quarterly dividends may not have been the sole (or even primary) mechanism by which 
firms increased their distributions to shareholders following the rate reduction.  If managers are concerned 
about the temporary nature of the rate reduction or the deleterious effects on signaling of a tax-motivated 
change in dividends, then firms may have opted for one-time, special dividends to distribute profits to   22
shareholders while dividend tax rates were at a historical low.  The next section reports results from tests 
designed to determine whether special dividends increased following enactment of the 2003 Act. 
To assess whether special dividends rose after the dividend tax rate reduction, we repeated the 
procedures that were used to select the sample of regular, quarterly dividends in Section 3, but instead of 
regular dividends, we selected special, one-time dividends (CRSP distribution code 1272).  Not 
surprisingly, special dividends occur much less often than regular, quarterly dividends with 62 firms 
declaring 84 special dividends over the seven-quarter investigation period (February 23, 2002 to 
November 22, 2003).   
  Table 7 shows the frequency of the special dividends across the seven quarters examined in the 
study.  Fifty-three (63 percent) special dividends were paid in the two quarters after enactment.  Using the 
non-parametric binomial test, we can reject at the 0.001 level that the increased frequency of special 
dividends following enactment occurred by chance.   
  To control for the possibility that the increase is attributable to non-tax factors, we analyze the 62 
firms using a logistic estimation approach.  The dependent variable is one in the firm-month when special 
dividends are paid and zero in all other months.  The explanatory variables are the same as in Table 3: 
earnings per share (EPS), free cash flow (FCF), the market-to-book ratio (MTB) and a categorical 
variable (POST) that equals one if the distribution is one of the 53 special dividends declared in the six 
months following enactment.  Table 8, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the explanatory 
variables.  The first column in Table 8, Panel B shows that the coefficient on POST is positive and highly 
significant, consistent with the frequency of special dividends increasing after enactment (and the 
univariate test results reported above).      
  Next, we attempt to assess whether the amount paid per special dividend increased after 
enactment using regression analysis.  Here the explanatory variables remain the same, while the 
dependent variable changes to special dividends per share (SD), which ranges from one penny to $1.46 
with a mean (median) value of 58 (25) cents (reported in Table 8, Panel A).  The second (third) column in 
Table 8, Panel B reports summary statistics using ordinary least squares (rank regressions).  The variable   23
of interest (POST) is not significantly different from zero in either regression, consistent with the amount 
of special dividends remaining constant after enactment.  To summarize, the frequency of special 
dividends increased after enactment, but the amount paid per special dividend did not change.   
  Lastly, we investigate the extent to which individuals and insiders own the firms that pay special 
dividends.  If special dividends dominate regular, quarterly dividends as an efficient means of distributing 
profits during a temporary reduction in tax rates, then individual shareholders, the sole beneficiaries of the 
rate reduction, should hold disproportionate interests in firms that issued special dividends after 
enactment.  Table 9 reports the individual and insider ownership of firms paying special dividends before 
enactment, during the first quarter following enactment and during the subsequent quarter.  It also lists the 
same measure for the 1,463 firms in the study that paid regular, quarterly dividends.   
  We find that individuals hold a greater percentage of the shares in companies that pay special 
dividends than they do in companies that pay regular, quarterly dividends.  For example, individuals held 
75 percent, on average, of the 22 firms that paid special dividends in the quarter immediately following 
enactment.  This compares with 54 percent for firms paying regular, quarterly dividends.  Reductions in 
the dividend tax rate, however, do not appear to account for the differences between individual investors 
in special dividend firms and individuals in regular, quarterly dividend firms.  The reason is that 
individuals held large proportions of special dividend firms, both before and after enactment.  For 
example, Table 9 shows that individuals held 86 percent of the 31 firms paying special dividends before 
enactment.  In short, it appears that firms that pay special dividends have been and remain 
disproportionately owned by individual investors.   
  Insider ownership is greater in post-enactment special dividend-paying firms than pre-enactment 
special dividend-paying firms, though not significantly greater.
14  In the two quarters after enactment, the 
                                                           
14 Sun Hydraulics Corporation, which is held 38 percent by insiders, provides an example of an insider influencing a 
special dividend after enactment.  In their July 10, 2003 announcement of a special dividend of $2.00 per share, they 
specifically attributed the idea of the special dividend to their largest shareholder, Robert E. Koski, former chairman 
and current board member.  Chairman Clyde Nixon said, “This distribution was proposed to the board of directors 
by the company’s largest shareholder, as a way to provide a measure of liquidity and a return to the company’s 
shareholders, in light of the stagnant market price of the company’s stock over the past four years.  Several factors   24
mean (median) inside ownership of the special dividend-paying firms was 13.4 (8.4) percent.  In the five 
quarters before enactment, the mean (median) inside ownership was 10.6 (3.1) percent of the outstanding 
shares.  However, neither difference is significant, which may be attributable to the small sample size.  
Using a t-test of the means (a median test), we reject at the 22 (8) percent level that the inside ownership 
of special dividend-paying firms remained the same or fell following enactment.  
  
6.  Share Repurchases 
  We conclude this study with an initial analysis of the impact of the dividend tax legislation on 
share repurchases.  Among others, Miller and Modigliani (1961), and Grullon and Michaely (2002) report 
that share repurchases are substitutes for dividends.  If so, a tax-induced boost in dividend payments after 
enactment should have resulted in a reduction in share repurchases.  This is true even though the capital 
gains tax rate, which applies to individuals who sell their shares in share buybacks, fell from 20 percent to 
15 percent.  The reason is that the dividend tax rate fell further than the capital gains tax rate.   
To explore the possibility that share repurchases declined after enactment, we review the 
repurchase activity of the 1,477 different companies evaluated in the regular and special dividend 
analyses above.  To avoid the possibility that firms delayed share repurchases once the President proposed 
dividend exemption in January 2003, we define the pre-enactment period as the seven months ending in 
December 2002 (i.e., June—December 2002).  The post-enactment period is the same seven months one 
year later (i.e., June—December 2003).  We find that share repurchases accounted for 29 percent of total 
distributions (defined as regular and special dividends plus repurchases) in the 2002 period, but only 19 
percent in the 2003 period.  We can reject at the 0.001 level that this slump in share repurchases after 
enactment occurred by chance.  Furthermore, we find that 800 firms repurchased shares before enactment, 
but only 646 firms following enactment, a 19 percent decline.  This decline in frequency is also 
significant at the 0.001 level.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
influenced the board’s decision: the recent reduction in the dividend tax rate to 15 percent, current low borrowing 
costs, and Sun’s strong balance sheet and cash flow.” 
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To determine whether firms shifted from share repurchases to dividends, we further examined the 
718 firms that changed both their regular dividends per share and their repurchases per share between 
2002 and 2003.  Of these firms, 93 percent increased their dividends.  This is consistent with both an 
aversion to reducing dividends and a dramatic increase in regular dividends between 2002 and 2003.  
Conversely, only 36 percent increased their share repurchases.  This is consistent with dividends 
following enactment partly substituting for share repurchases. 
These initial findings suggest that the cut in the dividend tax rate reduced the need for share 
repurchases.  However, there is an alternative explanation, which is beyond the scope of this paper.  
During 2003, many firms began to shift away from stock option compensation, slackening the demand for 
share repurchases.  Thus, it is possible that nontax considerations contributed heavily to the observed 
decline in share repurchases.   
 
7.  Conclusion 
The 2003 Act reduces the maximum statutory personal tax rate on dividend income from 38.1 
percent to 15 percent, the largest reduction ever.  Because dividend taxes are fundamental to capital and 
organizational structure, we anticipate this legislation providing a rich setting for studies in accounting, 
finance, and economics.  We begin that inquiry by asking whether the legislation led to an immediate 
increase in dividend declarations.  Many have long assumed that dividend taxes are an important binding 
constraint on corporate distributions.  If so, we would expect at least some companies to avail themselves 
of the first opportunities to adjust their dividends upward to a new optimal level.   
We find evidence that the legislation boosted regular and special dividends and dampened share 
repurchases.  The firms in this study had increased their total regular dividends by $3.8 billion (10 
percent) six months after passage of the legislation.  In those same six months, their special dividends 
were three-fold ($1.2 billion) the amount during the previous five quarters.  Meanwhile, share repurchases 
were 25 percent less in the final seven months of 2003, compared with the same period a year earlier.  In   26
short, this paper presents strong evidence that regular and special dividends rose and share repurchases 
fell after Congress reduced the dividend tax rate. 
However, it remains possible that the changes in distribution patterns relate to nontax influences, 
such as an expanding economy.  Our attempts to rule out alternative explanations by linking changes in 
distributions to ownership in the companies by individuals, the sole beneficiaries of the 2003 tax 
legislation, is less compelling.  In general, we find no evidence that companies held predominantly by 
individual investors, the only shareholders who benefited from the tax savings, were the ones changing 
their distribution patterns following enactment.  However, we do find some evidence that companies held 
heavily by insiders were more likely to increase both regular and special dividends.  
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Firm Characteristics for 1,463 Sample Firms Who Declared Dividends in the Six Months Following 
Enactment of the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations 
reported by CRSP as declaring a regular quarterly dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003 that 
have available information on the following variables: ∆DIV,  LAG∆DIV,  ∆EPS,  IND, and INSIDE.  ∆DIV is 
dividends per share as declared from 5/23/03 to 11/22/03 less dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 
5/22/03.  LAG∆DIV is dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 less dividends per share as declared 
from 5/23/02 to 11/22/02.  ∆EPS is quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 
less quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 5/23/02 to 11/22/02 (Compustat item 69).  DYIELD is 
annualized dividends in two quarters preceding 5/23/03, as a percentage of its share price on the declaration date.  
IND is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F filings and 
collected by CDA/Spectrum.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured by holdings of 
officers and directors as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.  Market value of equity is the market 
value of common stock (Compustat item 14 times Compustat item 61).  Total assets is the book value of assets 
(Compustat item 44).  Sales is net sales (Compustat item 2).  Net income is total net income (Compustat item 69).  
Debt-to-asset is the ratio of book value of debt (Compustat item 54) and total assets.  Return on assets is the ratio of 
annualized net income in the quarter preceding 5/23/2003 divided by total assets in the same period.  Return on 
equity is the ratio of annualized net income in the quarter preceding 5/23/2003 divided by book equity (Compustat 
item 60) in the same period.  Share price is the closing share price (Compustat item 14) in dollars.  Shares 
outstanding is (Compustat item 61) in millions.  Except where noted all dollar figures are in millions and are as of 
the end of the first quarter in fiscal year ending 2003. 
  
   Mean  Median Std Dev Min  25
th  75th  Max 
Market Value of Equity   4,836 578 17,857 3 134 2,384 246,677
Total Assets  12,534 1,280 62,260 7 459 4,510 1,187,035
Sales  1,022 144 3,450 0 22 618 57,224
Net Income  73 7 280 -480 1 39 4,324
Debt-to-Asset  0.68 0.72 0.24 0.04 0.52 0.90 1.33
Return on Assets  0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.46 0.01 0.06 0.56
Return on Equity  0.12 0.12 0.81 -21.06 0.07 0.17 17.15
Share Price  28 24 32 0 16 34 727
Shares Outstanding  140 26 478 1 7 84 7,894
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TABLE 2 
Regular Quarterly Dividends Per Share Declared 
 
This table reports dividend per share descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms, described in Table 1.  The data sample consists of all 
corporations reported by CRSP as declaring a regular quarterly dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003. 
 
Panel A  
Dividend Declarations by Quarter for the full Sample of 1,463 Firms (expressed in cents) 
Declaration Periods N  Total  $ 
(billions)
Mean Median Std Dev Min 25
th 75
th Max  Mean  of 
Within-Firm
Increases 
August 23, 2003—November 22, 2003  1,420 41.6 15.3  12.0  12.7  0.5  6.7  20.0 145.0 0.4  * 
May 23, 2003—August 22, 2003  1,402 40.7 15.0  12.0  12.9  0.5  6.3  20.0 145.0 0.7  * 
February 23, 2003—May 22, 2003  1,358 37.8 14.7  12.0  12.7  0.5  6.0  19.1 145.0 0.3  * 
November 23, 2002—February 22, 2003 1,324 36.9 14.8  12.0  12.8  0.5  6.0  19.0 145.0 0.1 
August 23, 2002—November 22, 2002  1,289 36.3 14.7  12.0  12.7  0.5  6.0  19.0 140.0 0.1 
May 23, 2002—August 22, 2002  1,330 36.2 14.5  11.3  12.7  0.5  6.0  19.0 140.0 0.1 
February 23, 2002—May 22, 2002  1,325 36.0 14.5  11.0  12.7  0.4  6.0  18.8 140.0  
 
Panel B 
The 1,280 Firms that Declared Regular Dividends in All Seven Quarters 
Declaration Periods  N  Total $ Mean Median Std Dev Min 25
th 75
th Max  Mean  of 
Within-Firm
Increases 
August 23, 2003—November 22, 2003  1,280 40.6 16.0 13.0  13.0 0.5  7.5  20.0 145.0 0.3  * 
May 23, 2003—August 22, 2003  1,280 40.0 15.6 12.7  13.0 0.5  7.0  20.0 145.0 0.5  * 
February 23, 2003—May 22, 2003  1,280 37.5 15.1 12.0  12.7 0.5  6.8  20.0 145.0 0.2  * 
November 23, 2002—February 22, 2003 1,280 36.8 15.0 12.0  12.8 0.5  6.6  19.5 145.0 0.2  * 
August 23, 2002—November 22, 2002  1,280 36.3 14.7 12.0  12.7 0.5  6.3  19.0 140.0 0.1 
May 23, 2002—August 22, 2002  1,280 35.9 14.6 11.7  12.7 0.5  6.1  19.0 140.0 0.1 
February 23, 2002—May 22, 2002  1,280 35.6 14.5 11.3  12.7 0.4  6.0  19.0 140.0  
 
* significant at the 0.001 level 
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TABLE 3 
Regression Analysis of the Change in Regular Dividends Following Enactment 
 
This table reports dividend per share descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms, described in Table 1.  
The data sample consists of all corporations reported by CRSP as declaring a regular quarterly dividend between 
February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003 that have available information on the following variables: DPS, EPS, 
FCF and MTB.   DPS is regular quarterly dividends per share as declared from 2/23/02 to 11/22/03.  EPS is 
quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 11/22/01 to 8/22/03 (Compustat item 69).    FCF is free 
cash flow reported during the period 11/22/01 to 8/22/03, which is defined as cash and short-term securities 
(Compustat Item 36) less accounts payable  (Compustat Item 46) less other current liabilities (Compustat 48) per 
share.  MTB is the market to book ratio flow reported during the period 11/22/01 to 8/22/03, defined as the market 
value of equity (Compustat Item 14 x Compustat Item 61) scaled by net book value (Compustat Item 61).  POST is a 




Descriptive Statistics (n=9171) 
   Mean  Med SD  Min  25
th 75th Max 
DPS  0.15 0.12 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.19 1.45 
EPS  0.39 0.35 0.74 -41.31 0.19 0.55 10.14 
FCF  -0.05 -0.01 0.08 -1.00 -0.09 -0.00 0.29 
MTB  2.23 1.82 12.64 -741.57 1.32 2.55 367.31 





Estimated Coefficient (p-value) from Regressions of the Regular Dividends Per Share 
Declared on a Categorical Variable Indicating a Quarter after Enactment of the 2003 Act 
(POST) and Control Variables for the Regular Dividends Declared from February 23, 2002 to 
November 22, 2003  
 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 pred  OLS Rank OLS Rank Logit 
Intercept   0.127**  3309.99** 0.129**  3102.29**  1.821** 
EPS  (+) 0.038**  0.36** 0.035** 0.35** 0.264** 
FCF  (+) -0.086  -0.15  -0.009  -0.14  -0.012 
MTB  (-) -0.000  0.06  -0.000  0.05  0.002 
POST  (+)  0.005* 124.95** 0.009**  202.61** 1.085** 
n    9,171 9,171 8,670 8,670 9,952 
adjusted R
2   0.05  0.18  0.05 0.17 
 
* (**) significant at the 0.05 (0.01) level 
 
•  Columns (1), (2) and (5) report results from estimates using the full sample of 1,463 firms that 
paid dividends during at least one quarter from February 23, 2002 to November 22, 2003. 
•  Columns (3) and (4) report results from estimates using the reduced sample of 1,280 firms that 
paid dividends every quarter from February 23, 2002 to November 22, 2003.  
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TABLE 4 
Statistical Information for the Regression Variables Testing a Link Between Dividend 
Increases and Individual Ownership 
  
This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations 
reported by CRSP as declaring a regular quarterly dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003 that 
have available information on the following variables: ∆DIV, LAG∆DIV, ∆EPS, IND, and INSIDE.  ∆DIV is 
dividends per share as declared from 5/23/03 to 11/22/03 less dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 
5/22/03.  LAG∆DIV is dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 less dividends per share as declared 
from 5/23/02 to 11/22/02.  ∆EPS is quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 
less quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 5/23/02 to 11/22/02 (Compustat item 69).  DYIELD is 
annualized dividends in two quarters preceding 5/23/03, as a percentage of its share price on the declaration date.  
IND is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F filings and 
collected by CDA/Spectrum.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured by holdings of 
officers and directors as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.     
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
  
   N  Mean  Median Std Dev Min  25
th   75th  Max 
∆DIV  1,463  0.022  0 0.068 -0.850 0 0.020  0.730
LAG∆DIV  1,463  0.008  0 0.049 -0.500 0 0.020  0.740
∆EPS  1,463  0.092  0.030 1.031 -15.010 -0.100 0.190  16.990
DYIELD  1,463  0.012  0.011 0.008 0 0.006 0.016  0.062
IND  1,463  0.542  0.525 0.292 0.008 0.285 0.825  1




Panel B:  Pearson’s (Spearman’s Rank) Correlation Coefficients over (under) 
the Diagonal (probability that the coefficient equals zero) for 1,463 observations 
  
   ∆DIV  LAG∆DIV  ∆EPS  DYIELD IND  INSIDE 
∆DIV  1.00  0.08 *  -0.00 -0.25 * -0.06  0.07 *
LAG∆DIV  0.24 *  1.00 0.00 0.01  0.03  0.01 
∆EPS  0.08 *  0.04 1.00 -0.01  -0.06  -0.08 *
DYIELD  -0.25 *  0.12 *  -0.03 1.00  0.22 *  -0.07 *
IND  0.00  0.12 *  -0.02 0.27 * 1.00  0.28 *
INSIDE  0.06  0.08 *  0.03 -0.07 * 0.35 *  1.00 
  
* significant at the 0.01 level 
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TABLE 5 
Estimated Coefficient (t-statistic) from Regressions of the Change in Regular Quarterly 
Dividends Per Share Declared (∆DIV) on Individual (IND) and Insider (INSIDE) 
Ownership of Stocks and Control Variables 
  
 This table reports multivariate analyses for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all 
corporations reported by CRSP as declaring a regular quarterly dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 
22, 2003 that have available information on the following variables: ∆DIV, LAG∆DIV, ∆EPS, IND, and INSIDE.  
∆DIV is dividends per share as declared from 5/23/03 to 11/22/03 less dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 
to 5/22/03.  LAG∆DIV is dividends per share as declared from 11/23/02 to 5/22/03 less dividends per share as 
declared from 5/23/02 to 11/22/02.  ∆EPS is quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 11/23/02 to 
5/22/03 less quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 5/23/02 to 11/22/02 (Compustat item 69).  
DYIELD is annualized dividends in two quarters preceding 5/23/03, as a percentage of its share price on the 
declaration date.  IND is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported in 13-F 
filings and collected by CDA/Spectrum.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured by 
holdings of officers and directors as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.   
 
 
                                                                    
   (1) (2) (3) 


























   -0.007
(-1.0) 





2    0.07  0.07  0.07 
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TABLE 6 
Estimated Coefficient (t-statistic) from Regressions of the Change in Regular Quarterly Dividends Per Share Declared (∆DIV) 
on Individual (IND) and Insider (INSIDE) Ownership of Stocks and Control Variables Under Various Specifications of the 
Pre- and Post-Enactment Quarters 
  
 This table reports multivariate analyses for a sample of 1,463 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations reported by CRSP as declaring a regular 
quarterly dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003 that have available information on the following variables: ∆DIV, LAG∆DIV, ∆EPS, IND, 
and INSIDE.  ∆DIV and LAG∆DIV are defined below.  ∆EPS is quarterly earnings per share over the same period as LAG∆DIV .  DYIELD is annualized dividends 
in two quarters preceding 5/23/03, as a percentage of its share price on the declaration date.  IND is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional 
investors as reported in 13-F filings and collected by CDA/Spectrum.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured by holdings of officers 
and directors as reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.   
                                                    
 
    (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Define: 
∆DIV 




































































Summary Statistics for the 84 Special Dividends Declared by 62 Firms from February 23, 2002 to November 22, 2003  
  
This table reports dividend descriptive statistics, expressed in cents, for a sample of 62 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations reported by 
CRSP as declaring a special dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003. 
 
  
Declaration Periods  Obs > 0 Total $ billions Mean  Median  Std Dev  Min  25
th  75
th  Max
August 23, 2003—November 22, 2003  31 0.644  51  25  78  1  10  68  400 
May 23, 2003—August 22, 2003  22 0.555  81  28  115  2  10  100  500 
February 23, 2003—May 22, 2003  8 0.230  71  53  86  4  5  100  250 
November 23, 2002—February 22, 2003  2 0.001  20  20  0  20  20  20  020 
August 23, 2002—November 22, 2002  14 0.161  44  17  62  2  5  36  200 
May 23, 2002—August 22, 2002  6 0.003  17  5  22  2  3  30  56 
February 23, 2002—May 22, 2002  1 0.000  10  10  0  10  10  10  10 
  
  36
TABLE 8  
Regression Analysis of the Change in Special Dividends Following Enactment 
 
 
 This table reports descriptive statistics for a sample of 62 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations 
reported by CRSP as declaring a special dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003 that have 
available information on the following variables: SD, EPS, FCF and MTB.   SD is dividends per share as declared 
from 2/23/02 to 11/22/03.  EPS is quarterly earnings per share as reported during the period, 11/22/01 to 8/22/03 
(Compustat item 69).    FCF is free cash flow reported during the period 11/22/01 to 8/22/03, which is defined as 
cash and short-term securities (Compustat Item 36) less accounts payable  (Compustat Item 46) less other current 
liabilities (Compustat 48) per share.  MTB is the market to book ratio flow reported during the period 11/22/01 to 
8/22/03, defined as the market value of equity (Compustat Item 14 x Compustat Item 61) scaled by net book value 
(Compustat Item 61).  POST is a categorical variable that equals 1 if the special dividend was declared between 
5/23/03 and 11/23/03; zero, otherwise. 
 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (n=82) 
  
   Mean  Med S D  Min  25
th 75th Max 
SD  0.57 0.25 0.86 0.01 0.07 1.00 5.00 
EPS  0.31 0.32 0.29 -0.23 0.12 0.42 1.52 
FCF  -0.44 -0.05 0.75 -4.86 -0.75 0.00 0.29 
MTB  1.75 1.59 0.94 0.61 1.15 1.97 6.99 





Panel B: Estimated Coefficient (p-value) from Regressions of 
the Special Dividends Per Share Declared on a Categorical 
Variable Indicating a Quarter after Enactment of the 2003 Act 
(POST) and Control Variables for the 82 Special Dividends 
Declared from February 23, 2002 to November 22, 2003  
 
  
 Logit OLS  Rank






























n  422 82  82 
adjusted R
2  0.08  0.20  
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TABLE 9  
Individual and Insider Ownership of the Firms Paying Special Dividends 
 
 This table reports individual and insider holdings for a sample of 62 U.S. firms.  The data sample consists of all corporations reported by CRSP as declaring a 
special dividend between February 23, 2002 and November 22, 2003.  IND is one less the percentage of shares that are held by institutional investors as reported 
in 13-F filings and collected by CDA/Spectrum.  INSIDE is the percentage of shares held by insiders as measured by holdings of officers and directors as 
reported in Thomson Financial’s Insider Filing Data.   
 
 
Panel A: Individual Ownership (IND) of Firms Paying Special Dividends (n=84) 
  
Declaration Periods  Obs  Mean Median  Std Dev Min 25
th  75
th  Max
August 23, 2003—November 22, 2003  31 0.79 0.84  0.22  0.29  0.72 0.96 1 
May 23, 2003—August 22, 2003  22 0.75 0.78  0.20  0.17 0.64 0.89 1 
February 23, 2002—May 22, 2003  31 0.86 0.88  0.14  0.51 0.75 0.98 1 
                




Panel B: Insider Ownership (INSIDE) of Firms Paying Special Dividends (n=84) 
  
Declaration Periods  Obs  Mean Median Std Dev Min 25
th  75
th  Max
August 23, 2003—November 22, 2003  31 0.12 0.11  0.12  0  0.02 0.17 0.53 
May 23, 2003—August 22, 2003  22 0.15 0.08  0.20  0  0.02 0.17 0.68 
February 23, 2002—May 22, 2003  31 0.11 0.03  0.15  0  0.01 0.12 0.59 
                
INSIDE for firms paying regular quarterly dividends  1,463 0.07  0.03  0.12 0  0.01 0.08 0.83 
 